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Abstract
What effect does the recent rise of populist parties harnessing an anti-system rhetoric have on political trust? Will citizens
become disenchanted with and lose trust in the political system, or could populist party success even stimulate a growth
of political trust? Arguing that populist parties may well be conceived as a corrective force giving voice to and addressing
citizen concerns about the established political system, this contribution hypothesizes that populist party success will in-
crease political trust among the general public, especially in countries lacking democratic quality, with weak corruption
control, and meagre government performance. Empirically, it combines ParlGov data with survey data from the European
Social Survey (2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-of-Democracy project and theWorld Development
Indicators to investigate how political trust has changed in relation to the growing success of populist parties and how
democratic quality, corruption control, and government performance have moderated this relationship in 23 European
democracies. Its main findings indicate that, at least in the short run, political trust increases rather than decreases fol-
lowing populist party success and that this increase in trust is most pronounced in political systems that lack democratic
quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only meager government performance.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have seen a new wave of populism across
Europe. Both right-wing and left-wing populist parties
have entered parliaments from Spain to Slovakia, and
in some countries have even won ruling majorities.
These developments have been unequivocally met with
concerns, most importantly with regard to the conse-
quences for the democratic political system (Galston,
2018; Puddington & Roylance, 2017). In light of coun-
tries like Hungary and Poland, where populists in power
have begun to dismantle the very core of liberal democ-
racy, these fears seem far from unwarranted. From a
political-culture perspective, one of the main concerns
is that citizens may lose trust in the established demo-
cratic political system and its institutions. With previous
contributions already finding a negative relationship be-
tween populism and political trust—voters of populist
parties tend to be less trusting of the political system
(Dahlberg & Linde, 2017; Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen,
2009) and low levels of political trust tend to further vot-
ing for populist parties (Doyle, 2011; Hooghe, Marien,
& Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn, 2018; Werts, Scheepers, &
Lubbers, 2012)—the recent rise of populism does not
bode well for Europe’s democracies. Yet, others have
pointed out the potentially healing effect of populism:
With new parties that challenge the establishment en-
tering the political stage, citizens formerly disappointed
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by and disenchanted with politics may reconcile with
the democratic system (Haugsgjerd, 2019; Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). This seems particularly likely
in democracies which leave a lot to be desired in the
eyes of citizens. In countries where democratic quality
is deficient, corruption rampant, and government perfor-
mance altogethermeager, populist parties can easily styl-
ize themselves—and indeed be conceived by citizens—
as saviors come to mend a broken system.
Literature on the relationship between populist party
success and political trust is scarce. While prior research
has studied a myriad of sources of political trust (for an
overview, seeMartini & Quaranta, 2020), the rise of pop-
ulist parties or the national party system more generally
has not yet received much attention as a source of po-
litical trust. Likewise, while scholarship on populist par-
ties has investigated a broad number of issues includ-
ing the relationship between voting for a populist party
and political trust (e.g., Hooghe et al., 2011; Söderlund &
Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2009), it has yet to explore the conse-
quences of the (system-level) rise of populist parties for
political trust among the general public. Regarding the
consequences of thesemacro-level developments, schol-
ars have begun studying how populism affects liberal
democracy (e.g., Biard, Bernhard, & Betz, 2019; Mudde
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Müller, 2016). Yet the major-
ity of them have focused on the impact populist par-
ties have on actual policies and the quality of democ-
racy, disregarding any effects on the attitudes of ordinary
citizens. The only exception is a recent contribution by
Haugsgjerd (2019), who demonstrates that supporters of
the Norwegian radical-right populist Fremskrittspartiet
have expressed increasing satisfaction with democracy
after the party had gained executive power in 2013.
Adding to both of these literatures, this article wants to
contribute to our understanding of what the new reali-
ties of populism mean for Europe’s democracies by ex-
amining how the electoral success of populist parties af-
fects political trust in the general public and whether
and how this effect varies across countries depending
on democratic quality, corruption control, and govern-
ment performance.
Empirically, this study combines ParlGov data (Döring
&Manow, 2018) on the electoral success of populist par-
ties with survey data from the European Social Survey
(2002–2016) as well as aggregate data from the Varieties-
of-Democracy project (Coppedge et al., 2019) and the
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2018). It
models how populist parties winning electoral votes
has affected changes in the level of political trust to
investigate how political trust has changed in relation
to the growing success of populist parties and how
democratic quality, corruption control, and government
performance have moderated this relationship in 23
European democracies. It finds that, despite them typi-
cally being characterized as a danger to democracy, pop-
ulist parties celebrating electoral successes, at least in
the short run, has no detrimental effect on political trust.
On the contrary, levels of political trust appear to even in-
crease after populist parties have gained electoral votes.
The analysis finds this increase in political trust to be
most pronounced in political systems that lack in demo-
cratic quality, struggle with corruption, and deliver only
meager government performance, indicating that pop-
ulist parties may be seen as more of a corrective force
in these countries.
2. The Populist Message and Political Trust
Populism, as defined by Mudde (2004, p. 543), is “an
ideology that considers society to be ultimately sepa-
rated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which ar-
gues that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (generalwill) of the people.” Both left- and right-
wing populist parties are thus united in their criticism of
the established democratic procedures, institutions, and
political elites (Galston, 2018).
Among other things, populists typically accuse es-
tablished parties and politicians of not caring about
the common people, not being responsive or account-
able to ordinary people’s demands, and of being in-
competent (Mudde, 2004; Sheets, Bos, & Boomgaarden,
2016). As care, responsiveness, accountability, and com-
petence are core components of what makes a political
system—or anyone, for that matter—appear trustwor-
thy (Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; van der Meer,
2010), these populist messages are bound to undermine
citizens’ trust in the political system. In line with these
expectations, prior research has demonstrated already
that populist messages lead to more negative views of
the political system among supporters of populist par-
ties (Rooduijn, van der Brug, de Lange, & Parlevliet, 2017)
and that populist voters are less trusting of the political
system than voters of other parties (Dahlberg & Linde,
2017; Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2009). A number
of results further indicate that the reception of anti-
systemmessages can damage citizens’ attitudes towards
the political system (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018;
Sheets et al., 2016). At the same time, disenchantment
with and cynicism about the political system has been
identified as a major driver of populist parties’ electoral
success (Cutts, Ford, & Goodwin, 2011; Hooghe et al.,
2011; Rooduijn, 2018). The relationship between pop-
ulist parties and citizens’ attitudes towards the political
system thus seems to be a mutually reinforcing, nega-
tive one: disenchantment with politics furthers populist
parties’ success and populist parties further disenchant-
ment with politics.
3. How Populist Party Success May Help Citizens
Regain Trust in Broken Systems
These individual-level correlations would suggest that
the rise of populist parties leads to a decline in politi-
cal trust among citizens in Europe. Yet, as recent studies
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indicate that populist parties entering parliaments and
governmentsmay actually increase trust and satisfaction
with democracy (Haugsgjerd, 2019), this article argues
that there is another mechanism at play when it comes
to the effects of populist party success.
Despite their anti-establishment and anti-system
platform, populist parties gaining in strength could have
a healing effect on political trust. For one, populist par-
ties winning votes and parliamentary seats may make
the political system appear more responsive to citizens’
demands. With citizens being disaffected with the polit-
ical system even before populist parties gained in popu-
larity (Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000)—and poten-
tially fueling populist parties’ electoral successes in the
first place (Cutts et al., 2011; Schumacher & Rooduijn,
2013)—, populist parties becoming represented in the
political systemmay help attenuate this disaffection and
reconcile citizens with the political system. Previous liter-
ature has already discussed the importance of represen-
tation for political trust. While the effects of descriptive
representation are ambiguous (Cowley, 2014; Gay, 2002;
Hinojosa, Fridkin, & Kittilson, 2017), actual as well as per-
ceived representation of interests can play a crucial role
in generating trust in democratic institutions (Cho, 2012;
Dunn, 2015; van der Meer & Dekker, 2011). As the lit-
erature demonstrates, it is representation in parliament,
not the sheer existence of (populist) parties that drives
this effect. For people to feel their voices are being heard
and their concerns are being taken seriously by the po-
litical system, the political actors actively voicing those
concerns—i.e., the populist parties—cannot be seen as
operating outside of this system but rather need to be
represented in at least some of its core institutions, par-
ticularly in parliament. The political system consequently
will only appear responsive to citizens’ concerns when
populist parties have become at least reasonably suc-
cessful, gaining substantive electoral and parliamentary
representation. Populist representation should of course
have positive effects especially for outright supporters of
populist parties and their ideologies. Nonetheless, even
if a majority of citizens may not agree with other as-
pects, e.g., the radical-right or radical-left parts of their
ideology, populist parties entering the political system
can make citizens feel like their own concerns about the
political system are finally being heard and taken seri-
ously, thereby increasing perceptions of the political sys-
tem as being caring and accountable, and, consequently,
more trustworthy (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2012). Populist parties could then be per-
ceived as a corrective force helping to right the wrongs
of the existing political institutions.
Second, established political parties and politicians
responding to the challenge raised by populist parties
may also contribute to citizens regaining trust in the
political system. In light of populist parties gaining in
strength, political discourse in many countries was re-
vitalized, with established parties and other civil soci-
ety actors emphasizing the advantages of the existing
political system and taking a decisively pro-democratic
and pro-system stance (e.g., Stanley, 2015; Verbeek &
Zaslove, 2015). Especially for citizens opposed to the
radical-right and radical-left ideologies, suddenly being
presented with the alternative to the existing political
system propagated by right- and left-wing populist par-
ties may help them gain renewed appreciation for the ex-
isting liberal democratic system and its institutions. With
regard to political participation, Immerzeel and Pickup
(2015) find that the emergence of successful right-wing
populist parties mobilizes those citizens most opposed
to a radical-right populist ideology. In spite of the anti-
systemmessage propelled by populist parties, them gain-
ing votes and/or parliamentary seats may thus act as a
corrective impulse and eventually increase political trust
among the general public. Again, the sheer existence of
populist parties is unlikely to spur these effects. For both
established parties and citizens opposed to the populists’
radical ideologies to rise to the challenge presented by
populist parties, they must consider this challenge to be
a serious one—which is likely only the case when pop-
ulists are actually becoming successful. Correspondingly,
prior research has shown established parties to react
to the populist challenge only after the populists have
started gaining traction in national or regional elections
(Schumacher & van Kersbergen, 2016; van Kessel, 2011).
Another way in which populist party success may af-
fect citizens’ trust in the political system is through the
classical ‘winner’ effect: Prior research on political trust
has demonstrated numerous times that those citizens
who voted for a party that ended up being in govern-
ment or gained in vote shares compared to the previous
election express more trust in their country’s political in-
stitutions (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug,
2005; Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Martini & Quaranta,
2019; van der Meer & Steenvoorden, 2018). Yet this win-
ner effect should apply only to the supporters of populist
parties, not to the general public. Instead, supporters of
at least some of the non-populist parties should experi-
ence a decline in political trust following populist parties’
electoral gains as these usually equal losses for the estab-
lished parties. Overall, wewould expect winner and loser
effects to cancel out and consequently not to increase
political trust in the general public.
While populist party success may also further the
spread of the populist anti-system message and thus
fuel distrust in the political system, this effect is proba-
bly negligible. With populists typically being exception-
ally proficient at making use of social and other digital
media to spread their message, we can safely assume
that citizens have heard and bought into the populist
anti-establishment and anti-system rhetoric long before
these parties became successful in the electoral arena
(Rooduijn, 2014). In fact, this is likely to be the reason
for them winning a sizeable number of votes in the first
place (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2010). We would
thus still expect populist party success to be followed by
an increase in political trust rather than a decrease:
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H1: Populist party success increases political trust in
the general public.
Yet this positive effect of populist parties’ success on po-
litical trust depends on populist parties being perceived
as or even actually acting as a corrective force in the po-
litical system. This implies that citizens have to perceive
their political system to be in need of correction in the
first place. While outright supporters of populist parties
may have already fully bought into the populist message
of the established political system being ‘broken’ regard-
less of howwell the system actually works, this is unlikely
to be the case for the general public. Despite prior re-
search having shown some disgruntlement with the ex-
isting political institutions to be present in every country
(Klingemann, 2014; Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000),
the extent to which the political system is in need of re-
pair depends on contextual factors like democratic qual-
ity, corruption control, and government performance. All
three of these contextual factors have previously been
identified as sources of political trust (e.g., Hakhverdian
&Mayne, 2012; van Erkel & van derMeer, 2016;Wagner,
Schneider, & Halla, 2009); yet, their conditioning effect
has seldom been studied.
However, democratic quality, corruption control, and
government performance may act as moderating factors
on the effect populist parties’ success can have on po-
litical trust as they determine the extent to which citi-
zens see their democratic system to be in need of re-
pair. If democratic quality is lacking, corruption is ram-
pant, and government performance in the economic, ad-
ministrative, or other realms is mediocre at best, citizens
may long more strongly for an ‘outsider’ (i.e., a populist
party) to enter the political system and tackle those prob-
lems. In addition, there is simply more room for improve-
ment in faulty democracies. If democratic quality is al-
ready exceptional, corruption virtually eradicated, and
government performance on an all-time high, there is
little established parties can improve in reaction to the
challenge raised by populist parties. In contrast, if demo-
cratic quality leaves a lot to be desired, corruption poses
a serious problem, or government performance is de-
ficient, established parties may be able to respond to
the criticism from populist parties by launching reforms
in these realms. We would thus expect the positive ef-
fect of populist success on political trust to be most pro-
nounced in those countries where democratic quality is
lacking, corruption control is weak, and government per-
formance low:
H2: Democratic qualitymitigates the effect of populist
party success on political trust.
H3: Corruption control mitigates the effect of populist
party success on political trust.
H4: Government performance mitigates the effect of
populist party success on political trust.
4. Data and Measurement
To examine how the rise of populist parties has af-
fected political trust in European democracies, this
study combines individual-level data from the European
Social Survey (2002–2016; European Social Survey, 2016)
with aggregate-level data from the ParlGov project
(1997–2016; Döring & Manow, 2018), V-Dem (v9;
1997–2016; Coppedge et al., 2019), and the World
Development Indicators (1997–2016; World Bank, 2018).
It analyzes how changes in populist party vote share re-
late to changes in political trust.
The dependent variable political trust is measured as
trust in three different political institutions: parliament,
parties, and politicians. These three institutions are ar-
guably the ones most in focus of populist parties’ anti-
establishment rhetoric, and the effects of populist party
success should thus be most pronounced for trust in
these institutions.
For the independent variable populist party success,
I calculate the gain in popular vote shares for populist
parties from one national parliamentary election to the
next based on the ParlGov data. The identification of pop-
ulist parties relies on the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019).
Table 1 lists those parties. Vote shares for all populist par-
ties within a single country and election are added up to
arrive at the total vote share for populist parties. Figure 1
gives an overview of the vote shares for populist parties
per country over time.
Election results are matched to the ESS data accord-
ing to the date of the election and the ESS fieldwork
period. For example, for ESS round 1 in Austria (fielded
between February and September 2003), the relevant
election took place on November 24, 2002. If an elec-
tion took place during the fieldwork period of the ESS,
the respective country-round was excluded. This con-
cerns the following countries: Cyprus (round 5), Estonia
(round 3), Greece (round 4), Netherlands (rounds 1, 3,
and 6), Slovenia (round 2), Sweden (round 7), United
Kingdom (round 7). Gains in vote shares are always cal-
culated from one ESS round to the next, so if no elec-
tion took place in between two ESS rounds, gains in
vote shares equals 0. Likewise, if more than one election
took place between two ESS rounds (i.e., when a country
skipped one or more ESS rounds or in the case of snap
elections), the change in populist vote shares equals the
difference between the election taking place closest to
the respective ESS round and the election taking place
before the previous ESS round.
For the moderating factors, democratic quality is
measured using V-Dem’s Index of Liberal Democracy,
corruption control is measured using V-Dem’s Index of
Political Corruption (recoded so that high values indicate
more corruption control), and government performance
is measured in terms of a composite measure combining
GDP growth, inflation (consumer prices), and unemploy-
ment. These aggregate-level data were allocated accord-
ing to the year of the ESS round (e.g., 2002 for round 1) in-
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Table 1. Populist parties in European Social Survey (ESS) countries.
Right-wing populist parties Left-wing populist parties
Austria Alliance for the Future of Austria; Freedom Party of Austria —
Belgium Flemish Interest; National Front —
Bulgaria Attack; National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria; —
Order, Law and Justice
Cyprus — Citizens’ Alliance
Czechia Coalition for Republic; Dawn-National Coalition; —
Freedom and Direct Democracy
Denmark Danish People’s Party; Progress Party —
Estonia Conservative People’s Party —
Finland Finns Party —
France Front National France Unbowed
Germany Alternative for Germany The Left
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally Democratic Social Movement, Syriza
Hungary Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Alliancea; Hungarian Justice and —
Life Party for a Better Hungary; Jobbik, the Movement
Iceland — —
Ireland — Sinn Féin
Italy Brothers of Italy; Northern League —
Latvia — —
Lithuania — —
Netherlands Fortuyn List; Party for Freedom Socialist Party
Norway Progress Party
Poland Kukiz ‘15; Law and Justiceb; League of Polish Families —
Portugal – –
Slovakia Real Slovak National Party; Slovak National Party —
Slovenia — United Left
Spain — Podemos
Sweden Sweden Democrats —
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party —
United Kingdom UK Independence Party —
Notes: Includes only countries that were surveyed in at least three ESS rounds. Identification of right-wing and left-wing populist parties
based on PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019). a since 2002, b since 2005.
stead of the year(s) the actual fieldworkwas done in each
country. While this means that data may not be coming
from the exact year that fieldwork was done, the offset is
reasonably small (maximum 1 year before the fieldwork
period). By using the ESS round year, which is typically
up to one year ahead of actual fieldwork, the analysis
avoids using data from years that have not yet passed
when ESS fieldwork was conducted (when fieldwork was
conducted in the beginning of the year), as well as hav-
ing to use data from different years for respondents from
the same country in the same ESS round (when fieldwork
spanned the turn of the year).
In addition, the models control for competing ex-
planatory variables of political trust. On the individual
level, control variables are economic performance eval-
uations (e.g., Mishler & Rose, 2001), political interest
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Figure 1. Populist party vote shares per country, 2001–2016. Source: ParlGov (1997–2016; Döring & Manow, 2018).
(e.g., Lü, 2014), and social trust (e.g., Zmerli & Newton,
2008). As the analysis aggregates data to the country-
round level and uses weighted means for this purpose,
standard sociodemographics are not included as control
variables. On the macro level, the analysis controls for
a country’s level of socioeconomic development: logged
GDP per capita (PPP; World Bank, 2018) and degree of
urbanization (World Bank, 2018).
The analysis includes only countries that were
sampled in at least three ESS rounds between 2002
and 2016 and that were rated as democratic (based
on V-Dem’s Regimes-in-the-World measure; Lührmann,
Tannenberg, & Lindberg, 2018) throughout the entire pe-
riod (1997–2016; ESS countries that do not match these
criteria: Croatia, Luxemburg, Russia, Turkey, andUkraine).
It excludes countries without a successful populist party,
i.e., which did not have at least one populist party gain
parliamentary seats in at least one election between
1997 and 2016. This applies to Iceland, Lithuania, and
Portugal. Robustness checks including these three coun-
tries do not yield substantially different results. After ex-
cluding country-rounds in which national parliamentary
elections took place during the ESS fieldwork period, the
data cover 148 country-rounds (130 country-rounds for
analyses of trust in political parties; 23 individual coun-
tries; Table 2).
For the empirical analysis, all data are aggregated to
the country-round level. The models regress changes in
political trust (trust in parliament, trust in parties, trust
in politicians) from one ESS round to the next on pop-
ulist party vote gain. Changes in political trust are cal-
culated as the difference in aggregated levels of trust
from one ESS round to the next. As there are no previ-
ous data for levels of political trust for the first ESS round
fielded in each country, the number of country-rounds
drops to 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians) and
107 (trust in parties), respectively.
All individual- and system-level control variables are
also modeled in terms of changes as compared to the
previous ESS round. For the moderating factors demo-
cratic quality, corruption, and government performance,
on the other hand, I use absolute levels as the extent to
which a political system lends itself to populist criticism
depends more on its absolute levels of democratic qual-
ity, corruption control, and government performance
than on changes in these contextual characteristics. In
addition, democratic quality and corruption control are
unlikely to change dramatically from one ESS round to
the next, so for most European democracies there is lit-
tle within-country variance in democratic quality and cor-
ruption control between 2002 and 2016.
5. Results
Starting with the main effect of populist party success
on political trust, Figure 2 presents the results for trust
in parliament, trust in political parties, and trust in
politicians. Corroborating the expectations, electoral suc-
cess of populist parties does not decrease political trust
among the general public. In contrast, most empirical
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Table 2. Country-rounds included in analysis.
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Austria • • • n/a n/a • •
Belgium • • • • • • • •
Bulgaria • • • •
Cyprus • • • •
Czechia • • • • • • •
Denmark • • • • • • •
Estonia • ele • n/a • • •
Finland • • • • • • • •
France • • • • • • • •
Germany • • • • • • • •
Greece • • ele •
Hungary • • • • • • • •
Ireland • • • • • • • •
Italy • n/a • •
Netherlands ele • ele • • ele • •
Norway • • • • • • • •
Poland • • • • • • • •
Slovakia • • • • •
Slovenia • • • • • • • •
Spain • • • • • • • •
Sweden • • • • • • ele •
Switzerland • • • • • • • •
United Kingdom • • • • • • ele •
Notes: • = country-round included, n/a = survey data is not included in cumulative ESS file or fieldwork dates were not recorded,
ele = country-round was excluded from analysis because election took place during fieldwork period.
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populist vote gains
GDP (logged)
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Figure 2.Main effects of populist party success on political trust. Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. N= 125
(trust in parliament, trust in politicians)/N = 107 (trust in parties). Model 1: bivariate. Model 2: including macro controls.
Model 3: including macro and micro controls. Model 4: including macro and micro controls plus democratic quality, cor-
ruption control, and economic performance. Sources: European Social Survey 2002–2016 (European Social Survey, 2016);
ParlGov 1997–2016 (Döring&Manow, 2018); V-Demv9 (Coppedge et al., 2019);World Development Indicators 2002–2016
(World Bank, 2018).
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models yield a significant positive effect of populist party
success on citizens’ trust in both parliament, political par-
ties, and politicians. The results thus support the hypoth-
esis that populist parties’ success may act as a corrective
force to the existing political system (H1). Whether this
is due to citizens seeing populist parties themselves as
being this corrective force and their sheer presence in
political institutions as making the political system more
caring and accountable or rather the consequence of es-
tablished parties and citizens responding to the populist
challenge with their own pro-system campaign cannot
be determined based on the present data. We can, how-
ever, assert that levels of political trust tend to increase
rather than decrease in the wake of populist party suc-
cess. This is the case for both the populist electorate and
the non-populist electorate, indicating that this is a gen-
eral effect rather than a mere ‘winner’ effect driven by
populist party supporters (re-)gaining trust in the politi-
cal system (cf. Supplementary File).
Going beyond the main effect of populist party suc-
cess on political trust, we expected this effect to be condi-
tional on contextual characteristics like democratic qual-
ity, corruption control, and government performance.
Figure 3 to Figure 5 graph these conditional effects.
Beginningwith themoderating effect of democratic qual-
ity, Figure 3 confirms that populist party success has dif-
ferent effects in countries with different levels of demo-
cratic quality. Corresponding to the theoretical conjec-
ture (H2), the effect of populist party successweakens for
countries with a higher level of democratic quality. As we
would have expected based on the corrective-force ar-
gument, for countries with a comparatively low level of
democratic quality, populist parties becoming more suc-
cessful in national parliamentary elections has a signifi-
cant positive effect on political trust among the general
public. Citizens in these countries seem to extend more
trust to both parliament, political parties, and politicians
following electoral successes of populist parties. For all
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Figure 3. Conditional effects of populist success on political trust: democratic quality. Notes: Unstandardized estimates
and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of democratic quality (0.05 scale points intervals).
Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urban-
ization; (levels of) corruption control, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians)/N = 107
(trust in parties). Sources: European Social Survey 2002–2016 (European Social Survey, 2016); ParlGov 1997–2016 (Döring
& Manow, 2018); V-Dem v9 (Coppedge et al., 2019); World Development Indicators 2002–2016 (World Bank, 2018).
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three institutions, this effect on citizen trust gradually de-
creases with increasing democratic quality and vanishes
completely for high-quality liberal democracies, suggest-
ing that citizensmay not perceive there to bemuch room
for improvement of the existing political system.
Turning to the moderating effect of corruption con-
trol, Figure 4 also shows results in linewith the corrective-
force argument. Instead of populist party success hav-
ing a more detrimental effect on political trust in coun-
tries with high levels of corruption—i.e., countries that
we would expect to lend themselves more easily to pop-
ulist criticism—it is precisely these countries where pop-
ulist success substantially increases political trust among
the general public. This again points to citizens perceiving
populist parties as a corrective force that can help tackle
the problems—in this case corruption—of the existing
political system. Like for democratic quality, populist
party success has no effect on political trust at all in those
countries where there is little room for improvement.
The picture looks virtually the same for the mod-
erating effect of economic performance (Figure 5). Yet
again, the effect of populist parties’ vote gains on trust
in parliament, trust in political parties, and trust in politi-
cians alike are conditional on the level of economic per-
formance in a given country, and the interaction effect
points to populist parties being seen as more of a correc-
tive force in countries with lacking government perfor-
mance. Populist parties receiving more votes in national
parliamentary elections has a significant positive effect
on political trust in countries with a comparatively low
level of economic performance. In countries with high
levels of economic performance, in contrast, populist
party success does not have any effect on political trust
among the general public at all. All results remain robust
to alternative model specifications (including country
dummies, including countries without a successful pop-
ulist party, including populists-in-government dummy,
including new-democracies dummy) and operationaliza-
30
20
10
0
1.
5
1
.5
0
–.
5
.5.4 .45 .55 .6 .65 .7 .8 .85 .9 .95 1.75
AMEs of populist party vote gain on trust in parliament
corrupon control
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
30
20
10
0
1
.5
0
–.
5
.5.4 .45 .55 .6 .65 .7 .8 .85 .9 .95 1.75
AMEs of populist party vote gain on trust in pares
corrupon control
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
30
20
10
0
1
.5
0
–.
5
.5.4 .45 .55 .6 .65 .7 .8 .85 .9 .95 1.75
AMEs of populist party vote gain on trust in policians
corrupon control
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 4. Conditional effects of populist success on political trust: corruption control. Notes: Unstandardized estimates and
95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of corruption (0.05 scale points intervals). Control vari-
ables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita, urbanization; (levels
of) democratic quality, economic performance. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians)/N = 107 (trust in parties).
Sources: European Social Survey 2002–2016 (European Social Survey, 2016); ParlGov 1997–2016 (Döring &Manow, 2018);
V-Dem v9 (Coppedge et al., 2019); World Development Indicators 2002–2016 (World Bank, 2018).
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Figure 5. Conditional effects of populist success on political trust: economic performance. Notes: Unstandardized esti-
mates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect for varying degrees of economic performance (0.05 scale points
intervals). Control variables: (changes in) perceptions of economic performance, political interest, social trust, GPD/capita,
urbanization; (levels of) democratic quality, corruption control. N = 125 (trust in parliament, trust in politicians)/N = 107
(trust in parties). Sources: European Social Survey 2002–2016 (European Social Survey, 2016); ParlGov 1997–2016 (Döring
& Manow, 2018); V-Dem v9 (Coppedge et al., 2019); World Development Indicators 2002–2016 (World Bank, 2018).
tions of the dependent (as satisfaction with democracy)
and independent (as gains in parliamentary seats) vari-
ables.While the results are clearly stronger for right-wing
populist parties, they tend to point in the same direc-
tionwhen looking at themuch smaller subset of left-wing
populist parties only as well. The same is the case when
comparing the populist to the non-populist electorates:
while the effects are somewhat stronger for the populist
electorate, they are still present in the non-populist elec-
torate (cf. Supplementary File).
6. Conclusion
In light of the most recent wave of populism across
Europe and the concerns voiced about this rise of pop-
ulism, this contribution set out to explore how the elec-
toral success of populist parties affects citizens’ trust in
the political system. Regarding this macro-level relation-
ship, it suggested that, despite previous findings evidenc-
ing a negative relationship between populist party sup-
port and political trust on the individual level, the elec-
toral success of populist parties may still increase polit-
ical trust among the general public. It argued that pop-
ulist parties may be perceived as a corrective force fi-
nally giving voice to and tackling concerns about the polit-
ical system that had long been prevalent among citizens.
Reasoning that there needs to be at least some room
for improvement for this corrective-force effect to come
into play, it further introduced democratic quality, cor-
ruption control, and government performance as contex-
tual factors conditioning the relationship between pop-
ulist party success and political trust.
Combining survey data from the European Social
Survey (2002–2016) with election data from the ParlGov
project (1997–2016) and aggregate data on the con-
textual characteristics from V-Dem and the World
Development Indicators for 23 European democracies, it
found that populist party success indeed has an over-
all positive effect on levels of political trust among the
general public. As far as the contextual characteristics
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were concerned, populist party success had the most
pronounced positive effect on political trust in countries
with comparatively low levels of democratic quality, cor-
ruption control, and government performance. For coun-
tries with very high levels of democratic quality, cor-
ruption control, and government performance, populist
parties gaining votes or parliamentary seats did not af-
fect political trust at all. These results corroborate the
corrective-force perspective: apparently, the perceived
and/or actual corrective effect of populist parties enter-
ing the political stage outweighs their anti-establishment
and anti-system message in the eyes of citizens at least
in the short run. Even though the present study cannot
determine whether this effect will be a long-lasting one,
its core findings add to and qualify both the theoreti-
cal and empirical assumptions of the bulk of the pop-
ulism literature, which considers populism to have un-
equivocally negative consequences for democracy (e.g.,
Galston, 2018; Müller, 2016; Pappas, 2019; Puddington
& Roylance, 2017), instead lending support to more bal-
anced assessments (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).
In particular, they contradict previous individual-level re-
sults that could be interpreted as suggesting a vicious cir-
cle of political distrust and support for populist parties
(Cutts et al., 2011; Dahlberg & Linde, 2017; Hooghe et al.,
2011; Rooduijn, 2018; Söderlund & Kestilä-Kekkonen,
2009) and underscore that we need to be careful not to
commit individualistic fallacies when discussing the con-
sequences of populism.
Based on the findings as well as limitations of this
study, three main questions may warrant further investi-
gation. For one, future research could make use of panel
data to examine whether different groups of citizens—
e.g., supporters of populist parties vs. non-supporters
of populist parties—react differently to populist party
success, and whether populist party success causes fur-
ther polarization of the general public. The use of panel
data would also present an opportunity to dig deeper
into the dynamics of potential winner and loser effects
among supporters of populist and supporters of non-
populist parties, which could only be explored to a very
limited extent here. It would, second, be fruitful to an-
alyze how established parties’ reactions to the populist
challenge condition the effect populist party success has
on political trust. For instance, does the inclusion of pop-
ulists in the political process, e.g., through coalition gov-
ernments, further gains in political trust by appeasing
citizens committed to the populist narrative or does it
rather serve to alienate citizens who oppose the pop-
ulists and/or their radical-right or radical-left ideologies?
Finally, and most importantly, we need to study the long-
term effects of populist party success. Can the represen-
tation of populist parties within the political system con-
tribute to stabilizing political trust or are the positive ef-
fects only short-term, with citizens quickly becoming dis-
illusionedwhen populists start pushing their radical-right
or radical-left agendas and/or disappointed by the new-
comers not actually bringing about the desired changes
to the political system? Given these limitations, the find-
ings presented here can only be a first indication as
to how the new realities of populist party success may
affect political systems across Europe. At their present
stage, they may warrant some cautious optimism. While
there are many good reasons to be wary of the rise of
populist parties, for political trust—and thereby for the
stability of democracy—, these newcomers to the polit-
ical stage, at least for now, seem to be less detrimental
than we may have thought.
Acknowledgments
I greatly appreciate the provision of data by the Euro-
pean Social Survey, ParlGov, the Varieties-of-Democracy
Project, and the World Bank. I would like to thank the
participants of the American Political Science Associa-
tion (APSA) Annual Meeting 2019 inWashington and the
EUROLAB Authors’ Conference 2019 in Cologne, espe-
cially Sandra Grahn, Sergio Martini, Pippa Norris, and
Mario Quaranta, as well as Nils Jungmann, Antonia May,
Anne-Kathrin Stroppe, and Katharina Werhan for their
valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. I am
also grateful to three anonymous reviewers as well as
Jonas Linde and Heidi Schulze for their constructive criti-
cism and suggestions.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
Supplementary Material
Supplementarymaterial for this article is available online
in the format provided by the author (unedited).
References
Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T., &
Listhaug, O. (2005). Losers’ consent: Elections and
democratic legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Anderson, C. J., & LoTempio, A. J. (2002). Winning, losing
and political trust in America. British Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 32(2), 335–351. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0007123402000133
Biard, B., Bernhard, L., & Betz, H.-G. (Eds.). (2019). Do
they make a difference? The policy influence of radi-
cal right populist parties in Western Europe. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., & de Vreese, C. (2010). Media
coverage of right-wing populist leaders. Communi-
cations, 35(2), 135. https://doi.org/10.1515/comm.
2010.008
Cho, W. (2012). Accountability or representation? How
electoral systems promote public trust in African leg-
islatures. Governance, 25(4), 617–637. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468--0491.2012.01598.x
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 45–58 55
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I.,
Teorell, J., Altman, D., . . . Ziblatt, D. (2019). V-Dem
country-year dataset v9 [Data set]. https://doi.org/
10.23696/vdemcy19
Cowley, P. (2014). Descriptive representation and
political trust: A quasi-natural experiment util-
ising ignorance. The Journal of Legislative Stud-
ies, 20(4), 573–587. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13572334.2014.937121
Cutts, D., Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (2011). Anti-
immigrant, politically disaffected or still racist after
all? Examining the attitudinal drivers of extreme right
support in Britain in the 2009 European elections. Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Research, 50(3), 418–440.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475--6765.2010.01936.x
Dahlberg, S., & Linde, J. (2017). The dynamics of the
winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy: Ev-
idence from a Swedish citizen panel. International
Political Science Review, 38(5), 625–641. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0192512116649279
Döring, H., & Manow, P. (2018). Parliaments and gov-
ernments database (ParlGov): Information on parties,
elections and cabinets inmodern democracies. Stable
version. Retrieved from http://www.parlgov.org
Doyle, D. (2011). The legitimacy of political institutions.
Comparative Political Studies, 44(11), 1447–1473.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011407469
Dunn, K. (2015). Voice, representation and trust in parlia-
ment. Acta Politica, 50(2), 171–192. https://doi.org/
10.1057/ap.2014.15
European Social Survey. (2016). Cumulative round
1–8 data. NSD—Norwegian Centre for Research
Data, Norway—Data archive and distributor of
ESS data for ESS ERIC. Retrieved from http://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org
Galston, W. A. (2018). The populist challenge to lib-
eral democracy. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 5–19.
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0020
Gay, C. (2002). Spirals of trust? The effect of descriptive
representation on the relationship between citizens
and their government. American Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 46(4), 717–732. https://doi.org/10.2307/
3088429
Hakhverdian, A., & Mayne, Q. (2012). Institutional trust,
education, and corruption: A micro-macro interac-
tive approach. The Journal of Politics, 74(3), 739–750.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381612000412
Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & de Vreese, C. (2018). Fram-
ing blame: Toward a better understanding of the ef-
fects of populist communication on populist party
preferences. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and
Parties, 28(3), 380–398. https://doi.org/10.1080/
17457289.2017.1407326
Haugsgjerd, A. (2019). Moderation or radicalisation?
How executive power affects right-wing populists’
satisfaction with democracy. Electoral Studies, 57,
31–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.09.
008
Hinojosa, M., Fridkin, K. L., & Kittilson, M. C. (2017).
The impact of descriptive representation on “persis-
tent” gender gaps: Political engagement and politi-
cal trust in Uruguay. Politics, Groups, and Identities,
5(3), 435–453. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.
2017.1330215
Hooghe, M., Marien, S., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Where
do distrusting voters turn if there is no viable exit
or voice option? The impact of political trust on
electoral behaviour in the Belgian regional elections
of June 2009. Government and Opposition, 46(2),
245–273. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477--7053.
2010.01338.x
Immerzeel, T., & Pickup, M. (2015). Populist radical
right parties mobilizing ‘the people’? The role of
populist radical right success in voter turnout. Elec-
toral Studies, 40, 347–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.electstud.2015.10.007
Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing pop-
ulists in Western Europe? Comparative Political
Studies, 41(1), 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0010414006294168
Kasperson, R. E., Golding, D., & Tuler, S. (1992). So-
cial distrust as a factor in siting hazardous fa-
cilities and communicating risks. Journal of So-
cial Issues, 48(4), 161–187. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1540--4560.1992.tb01950.x
Klingemann, H.-D. (2014). Dissatisfied democrats: Demo-
cratic maturation in old and new democracies. In
R. J. Dalton & C. Welzel (Eds.), The civic culture
transformed: From allegiant to assertive citizens (pp.
116–157). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Lü, X. (2014). Social policy and regime legitimacy: The ef-
fects of education reform in China. American Politi-
cal Science Review, 108(2), 423–437. https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0003055414000124
Lührmann, A., Tannenberg, M., & Lindberg, S. I. (2018).
Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening new avenues
for the comparative study of political regimes. Pol-
itics and Governance, 6(1), 60–77. https://doi.org/
10.17645/pag.v6i1.1214
Martini, S., & Quaranta, M. (2019). Political support
among winners and losers: Within- and between-
country effects of structure, process and perfor-
mance in Europe. European Journal of Political
Research, 58(1), 341–361. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1475-6765.12284
Martini, S., & Quaranta, M. (2020). Citizens and democ-
racy in Europe: Context, changes and political sup-
port. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of
political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theo-
ries in post-communist societies. Comparative Politi-
cal Studies, 34(1), 30–62.
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government
and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (Eds.). (2012). Pop-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 45–58 56
ulism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or correc-
tive for democracy? New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Müller, J.-W. (2016).What is populism? Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). Critical citizens: Global support
for democratic governance. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Pappas, T. S. (2019). Populism and liberal democracy: A
comparative and theoretical analysis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Pharr, S. J., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (2000). Disaffected
democracies: What’s troubling the trilateral coun-
tries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Puddington, A., & Roylance, T. (2017). The dual threat of
populists and autocrats. Journal of Democracy, 28(2),
105–119. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0028
Rooduijn, M. (2014). The mesmerising message: The
diffusion of populism in public debates in Western
European media. Political Studies, 62(4), 726–744.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467--9248.12074
Rooduijn, M. (2018). What unites the voter bases
of populist parties? Comparing the electorates
of 15 populist parties. European Political Science
Review, 10(3), 351–368. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1755773917000145
Rooduijn, M., van der Brug, W., de Lange, S. L., & Par-
levliet, J. (2017). Persuasive populism? Estimating
the effect of populist messages on political cynicism.
Politics and Governance, 5(4), 136. https://doi.org/
10.17645/pag.v5i4.1124
Rooduijn, M., van Kessel, S., Froio, C., Pirro, A., de Lange,
S., Halikiopoulou, D., . . . Taggart, P. (2019). The Pop-
uList: An overview of populist, far right, far left and
Eurosceptic parties in Europe [Data set]. Retrieved
from http://popu-list.org
Schumacher, G., & Rooduijn, M. (2013). Sympathy
for the ‘devil’? Voting for populists in the 2006
and 2010 Dutch general elections. Electoral Studies,
32(1), 124–133. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.
2012.11.003
Schumacher, G., & van Kersbergen, K. (2016). Do main-
stream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism
of populist parties? Party Politics, 22(3), 300–312.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068814549345
Sheets, P., Bos, L., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2016). Me-
dia cues and citizen support for right-wing pop-
ulist parties. International Journal of Public Opinion
Research, 28(3), 307–330. https://doi.org/10.1093/
ijpor/edv014
Söderlund, P., & Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2009). Dark side
of party identification? An empirical study of politi-
cal trust among radical right-wing voters. Journal of
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 19(2), 159–181.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17457280902799014
Stanley, B. (2015). Confrontation by default and con-
frontation by design: Strategic and institutional re-
sponses to poland’s populist coalition government.
Democratization, 23(2), 263–282. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13510347.2015.1058782
van der Meer, T. W. G. (2010). In what we trust? A
multi-level study into trust in parliament as an eval-
uation of state characteristics. International Review
of Administrative Sciences, 76(3), 517–536. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0020852310372450
van der Meer, T. W. G., & Dekker, P. (2011). Trustworthy
states, trusting citizens? Amultilevel study into objec-
tive and subjective determinants of political trust. In
S. Zmerli &M. Hooghe (Eds.), Political trust: Why con-
text matters (pp. 95–116). Colchester: ECPR Press.
van der Meer, T. W. G., & Steenvoorden, E. H. (2018).
Going back to the well: A panel study into the elec-
tion boost of political support among electoral win-
ners and losers. Electoral Studies, 55, 40–53. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.06.007
van Erkel, P. F. A., & van der Meer, T. W. G. (2016).
Macroeconomic performance, political trust and the
great recession: A multilevel analysis of the effects
of within-country fluctuations in macroeconomic
performance on political trust in 15 EU countries,
1999–2011. European Journal of Political Research,
55(1), 177–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.
12115
van Kessel, S. (2011). Explaining the electoral per-
formance of populist parties: The Netherlands as
a case study. Perspectives on European Politics
and Society, 12(1), 68–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/
15705854.2011.546148
Verbeek, B., & Zaslove, A. (2015). Italy: A case ofmutating
populism? Democratization, 23(2), 304–323. https://
doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076213
Wagner, A. F., Schneider, F., & Halla, M. (2009). The qual-
ity of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in
Western Europe—A panel analysis. European Journal
of Political Economy, 25(1), 30–41. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.08.001
Werts, H., Scheepers, P., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Euro-
scepticism and radical right-wing voting in Eu-
rope, 2002–2008: Social cleavages, socio-political
attitudes and contextual characteristics determin-
ing voting for the radical right. European Union
Politics, 14(2), 183–205. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1465116512469287
World Bank. (2018). World development indicators,
1960–2017 [Data set]. Retrieved from http://data.
worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators
Zmerli, S., & Newton, K. (2008). Social trust and attitudes
toward democracy. Public Opinion Quarterly, 72(4),
706–724. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfn054
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 45–58 57
About the Author
Marlene Mauk is a Research Associate in political science at GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne. She
holds a PhD in Comparative Politics from Mainz University. Her research interests lie in the field of political culture, with
a focus on the comparison between democracies and autocracies; among other topics, she studies political trust and its
sources, political value orientations, and various aspects of democratic quality. She is the author of Citizen Support for
Democratic and Autocratic Regimes (2020, Oxford University Press).
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 45–58 58
